





























San Francisco &untie Sup• e rior Court 
OCT 0 3 2019 




SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 






CASE NO. CGC-19-574770 
ORDER SUSTAINING DEFENDANT'S 
DEMURRER TO THE SECOND AMENDED 
COMPLAINT AND DISMISSING ACTION 
WITH PREJUDICE 
ORDER SUSTAINING DEFENDANT'S DEMURRER TO THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DISMISSING ACTION WITH 





























On September 23, 2019, Defendant Salesforce.com, Inc.'s demurrer to plaintiffs' Second 
Amended Complaint came on regularly for hearing before the Court. Sharon Arkin appeared on 
behalf of plaintiffs; Kristin A. Linsley and Matthew S. Kahn appeared for defendant. Having 
considered the pleadings and arguments of counsel, the Court rules as follows: 
At the threshold, the Court must decide whether to rule on the demurrer, based on the 
following facts. On Friday afternoon, September 20, the Court issued its tentative ruling sustaining 
defendant's demurrer without leave to amend.' The same afternoon, pursuant to the Rules of Court 
and the Court's local rules, plaintiffs' counsel notified the Court and defendant's counsel that they 
intended to appear on Monday, September 23, to contest the tentative ruling. However, late on the 
evening of Sunday, September 22, plaintiffs electronically served and filed a request for dismissal of 
the entire action without prejudice. In light of this background, plaintiffs contend that the demurrer is 
moot; defendant, on the other hand, contends that plaintiffs' purported voluntary dismissal is 
ineffective. The Court permitted the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing this issue, and now 
agrees with defendants' position. 
In general, a plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss an action at any time before the "actual 
commencement of trial." (Code Civ. Proc. § 581(c).) Although the right to dismiss is sometimes 
referred to loosely as "absolute," it is not: "Code of Civil Procedure section 581 recognizes 
exceptions to the right; other limitations have evolved through the court's construction of the term 
`commencement of trial.'" (Cravens v. State Board of Equalization (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 253, 256.) 
The meaning of the term "trial" is not restricted to jury or court trials on the merits, but includes other 
procedures, such as an order sustaining a defendant's general demurrer without leave to amend, that 
"effectively dispose of the case." (Wells v. Marina City Properties, Inc. (1981) 29 Ca1.3d 781, 785, 
citing Goldtree v. Spreckels (1902) 135 Cal. 666, 672-673.) "The 'purpose' in cutting off the 
plaintiff's absolute right to dismissal upon commencement of trial is to avoid abuse by plaintiffs who, 
Plaintiffs' "objection" to the Court's tentative ruling on the ground that it was emailed to only one 
of plaintiffs' multiple attorneys is groundless. The tentative ruling sustaining the demurrer 
without leave to amend was posted on the Court's website, as contemplated by Cal. R. Ct. 3.1308 
and the Court's Local Rules; the Court emailed the full tentative to counsel as a courtesy. And 
plaintiffs' counsel unquestionably received it, as shown by their email the same afternoon stating 
their intention to appear to contest the tentative. 
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when led to suppose a decision would be adverse, would prevent such decision by dismissing without 
prejudice and refiling, thus subjecting the defendant and the courts to wasteful proceedings and 
continuous litigation.'" (Mesa Shopping Center-East, LLC v. Hill (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 890, 904, 
quoting Kyle v. Carmon (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 901, 909.) 
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before the court actually rules on a demurrer or motion for summary judgment, but after it issues a 
tentative ruling granting such a dispositive motion. While our Supreme Court has not decided the 
issue, and the Courts of Appeal have reached varying conclusions on the issue, the weight of recent 
authority holds that after an adverse tentative ruling on a dispositive motion has been announced, the 
plaintiff may not thereafter voluntarily dismiss the action without prejudice to avoid the anticipated 
ruling. (E.g., Franklin Capital Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 187, 200-203 [summarizing rule as 
follows: voluntary dismissal is ineffective if taken "in the light of a public and formal indication by 
the trial court of the legal merits of the case"] [collecting authority]; Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Superior 
Court (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 769, 776 ["a tentative ruling sustaining a demurrer without leave to 
amend bars a voluntary dismissal"]; Groth Bros. Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Gallagher (2002) 97 
Cal.App.4th 60, 70.) The rationale for this rule has been articulated as follows: 
Not only does allowing a plaintiff to file a voluntary dismissal without prejudice in the face of 
a tentative ruling that the court will sustain the demurrer without leave to amend waste the 
time and resources of the court and other parties and promote annoying and continuous 
litigation, but we are persuaded that allowing such dismissal in the circumstances of this case 
undermines . . . the tentative ruling system. 
(Groth Bros. Oldsmobile, Inc., 97 Cal.App.4th at 70; see also Cowan v. Krayzman (2011) 196 
Cal.App.4th 907, 919 [such "conduct smacks of gamesmanship, undercuts the tentative ruling 
system, and wastes the resources of the court and opposing parties"]; California Practice Guide: 
Civil Procedure Before Trial ¶ 11:253, at 11-14 (The Rutter Group 2018) [observing that rule 
precluding dismissal following adverse tentative ruling "seems correct from a policy standpoint"].) 
This Court agrees. Accordingly, plaintiffs' request for dismissal is denied, and the Court will 
proceed to decide the demurrer. 
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Defendant Salesforce.com, Inc.'s demurrer to plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint is 
sustained without leave to amend. Section 230 of the federal Communications Decency Act 
("CDA"), 47 U.S.C. § 230, bars the instant claims. 
"There are three essential elements that a defendant must establish in order to claim section 
230 immunity. They are `(1) the defendant [is] a provider or user of an interactive computer service; 
(2) the cause of action treat[s] the defendant as a publisher or speaker of information; and (3) the 
information at issue [is] provided by another information content provider."' (Delfino v. Agilent 
Techs., Inc. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 790, 804-805.) 
The CDA provides that the provider of an "interactive computer service" is immune from 
liability for third-party information (like the advertisements on Backpage) unless the provider "is 
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of [the] information." (47 U.S.C. 
§§ 230(c)(1) and (f)(3).) The term "interactive computer service" is broadly defined and applies to 
software providers such as defendant. (47 U.S.C. 230(f)(2),(4) [defining "interactive computer 
service" to include "any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or 
enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server" and "access software provider" as "a 
provider of software (including client or server software), or enabling tools" that "(A) filter, screen, 
allow, or disallow content; (B) pick, choose, analyze, or digest content; or (C) transmit, receive, 
display, forward, cache, search, subset, organize, reorganize, or translate content."]; see Zango, Inc. 
v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc. (9th Cir. 2009) 568 F.3d 1169, 1173-1176 [holding that antivirus software 
company is a provider of an "interactive computer service" entitled to immunity under section 230]; 
Delfino v. Agilent Techs., Inc. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 790, 805 ["Courts have broadly interpreted the 
term 'interactive computer service' under the CDA."]; see also, e.g., Gonzalez v. Google, Inc. (N.D. 
Cal. 2017) 282 F.Supp.3d 1150, 1164-166 [holding that plaintiffs sought to treat Google as a 
publisher of ISIS's content where they alleged that it knowingly provided ISIS followers with 
material support including "expert assistance, communications equipment, and personnel"].) Here, 
although plaintiffs strenuously argue that defendant Salesforce is outside these broad statutory 
definitions, their argument is belied by their own allegations in the second amended complaint, which 
expressly allege that defendant's customer relationship management (CRM) software provides 
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"operational support" to Backpage by supplying "tools" that enabled it, among other things, to create 
platforms for Backpage to contact and procure customers, manage customer histories, provide and 
manage Backpage's customer database, and provide and manage a secure cloud storage database for 
Backpage to store and secure the details of its business. (Second Amended Complaint, 1147, 150, 
152.) Further, as they concede, defendant is not responsible, in whole or in part, for the 
advertisements placed by third parties on Backpage.com. Defendant therefore meets prong one of the 
above test. 
Plaintiffs' claims also treat defendant as the publisher of the information. Plaintiffs allege that 
Backpage's third-party classified advertisements caused them to be exploited. (Second Amended 
Complaint, ¶1131, 138.) Defendant can only be liable if it is linked to these advertisements and 
therefore, plaintiff is treating defendant as a publisher, since its "platform and CRM" enabled 
Backpage to publish and disseminate content. "Section 230(c)(1) is implicated not only by claims 
that explicitly point to third party content but also by claims which, though artfully pleaded to avoid 
direct reference, implicitly require recourse to that content to establish liability or implicate a 
defendant's role, broadly defined, in publishing or excluding third party [c]ommunications." (Cohen 
v. Faceboolc Inc. (E.D.N.Y. 2017) 252 F.Supp.3d 140, 156.) Plaintiffs' argument that the CDA 
applies only to "defamation-type" claims is erroneous as a matter of law. (See Doe II v. MySpace 
Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 561, 568 ["The express language of the statute indicates Congress did 
not intend to limit its grant of immunity to defamation claims. Instead, the legislative history 
demonstrates Congress intended to extend immunity to all civil claims..."].) Defendant meets prong 
two.2
Backpage's advertisements caused the harm. (Second Amended Complaint, ¶1131, 138.) 
There is no allegation that defendant created the specific content at issue (i.e. Backpage's 
2 Significantly, Backpage itself has been held to be protected by section 230. (See, e.g., Jane Doe 
No. 1 v. Backpage.Com, LLC (1st Cir. 2016) 817 F.3d 12, 19-21 [affirming dismissal of claims 
against Backpage for engaging in sex trafficking of minors, finding that claims treat Backpage as 
the publisher or speaker of the content of the challenged advertisements].) If Backpage itself is 
immune under section 230, it is difficult to fathom why a third-party software provider such as 
defendant Salesforce, whose connection to the offending advertisements is far more attenuated, 
would not be entitled to the same protection. 
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advertisements), and indeed plaintiffs concede it did not. Plaintiffs' claim is that Backpage misused 
defendant's CRM tools. (Second Amended Complaint, ¶150 [listing defendant's services]; ¶152 
["Backpage implemented Salesforce's tools and platforms"].) Defendant meets prong three. 
The court rejects plaintiffs' argument that recent amendments to the CDA allow their state 
law claims to proceed. These amendments, the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex 
Trafficking Act of 2017 or "FOSTA," Pub. L. No. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253 (2018), were signed into 
law on April 11, 2018. (Woodhull Freedom Foundation v. United States (D.D.C. 2018) 334 
F.Supp.3d 185, 190 [upholding constitutionality of FOSTA].) FOSTA exempted only three 
categories of sex trafficking claims: (1) private federal civil claims brought in federal court under 18 
U.S.C. § 1595; (2) state criminal prosecutions; and (3) state attorney general civil actions. (47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(e)(5); 18 U.S.C. § 1595(d); see Woodhull Freedom Foundation, 334 F.Supp.3d at 191-192.) 
Nothing in the text of the statutes exempted private civil state law claims from immunity. The Court 
is not persuaded by plaintiffs' argument that the general language in the preamble to the amendments 
overrides the plain language of the amendments themselves. (See Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. 
v. United States (2016) 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1978 [prefatory clause to legislation "announces an objective 
that Congress hoped that the Department would achieve . . . , but it does not change the plain 
meaning of the operative clause"]; Gonzalez v. Google, Inc., 282 F.Supp.3d at 1160-1161 ["It is well 
settled that prefatory clauses or statements of purpose do not change the plain meaning of an 
operative clause"].) 
Finally, the Court declines plaintiffs' request for leave to amend. Plaintiffs had an 
opportunity to amend their complaint after defendant filed a prior demurrer on the same grounds, 
although the Court did not rule on that demurrer because plaintiffs submitted their second amended 
complaint for filing before it could be heard. Further, amendment of the complaint would be futile 
because plaintiffs' claims "fall squarely within the CDA's immunity provision, as a matter of law, 
and cannot be cured by amendment." (Igbonwa v. Facebook, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2018) 2018 WL 
4907632, at *7; see also, e.g., Sikhs for Justice v. Facebook, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2015) 144 F.Supp.3d 
1088, 1095-1096 [dismissing claims against Facebook without leave to amend on the basis that they 
were barred under section 230(c) as a matter of law].) 
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Accordingly, defendant's demurrer to the second amended complaint is sustained without 
leave to amend, and the action is dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: October , 2019 
HON. ETHAN P. SCI1ULMAN 
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